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INTRODUCTION
It is undisputed that the irrigators diverted water exactly as depicted in the
PD without regard to Minnie Maud or a company service area. It is undisputed
that the PD assigns specific water rights to each property and that this manner of
irrigation has persisted for more than 100 years—since at least 1913. It is this
history of water use Carlson is determined to undo. He insists on a rewind to
1902 to retrofit this zombie corporation with a life and a scope and a power it
never had in real life. This, because in 1998 he acquired shares in a corporation
formally dissolved in 1974.
Carlson raises four principle arguments to protect this result.

First,

defying his stipulation, he challenges EnerVest’s appellate standing. He next
defends the judgment, and contends EnerVest did not preserve an argument
(that the summary judgment is inconsistent with the PD) and that if preserved,
this argument improperly expands the proceeding below. Finally, Carlson
invokes equity-based “alternative grounds” to affirm.

1

ARGUMENT
A. EnerVest has appellate standing.
1. Carlson stipulated to standing.
Section 24 standing requires a water use “claimant,” “a valid, timely
objection,” and the claimant’s “direct interest” in it. Utah Code §73-4-24(1). The
parties so stipulated: “EnerVest and [Carlson’s] predecessors … did not [object to
the PD] … both parties have standing … because they are claimants to the use of
water and have a direct interest in … the pending Objections. (R(2)-262265)(Carlson brf., Addendum G). Carlson further stipulated that this action “is
the proper process to resolve the Objections and the parties’ related disputes.”
(R(2)-263).
He does not claim that the stipulation is unenforceable. It is. In re E.H.,
2006 UT 36, ¶52, 137 P.3d 809 (“[I]n Utah standing acquired by stipulation is
enforceable.”).1 Upon court acceptance, it is “‘an estoppel upon the parties’” and
“‘conclusive of all matters necessarily included’” within it. Yeargin v. State, 2001
UT 11, ¶20, 20 P.3d 287 (citations omitted). The stipulation “has all the binding

In re E.H “[did] not [conclude] that a court must always honor [stipulated
standing][;] neither d[id] [it] categorically reject the notion that standing, unlike
jurisdiction, can arise from an agreement.” 2006 UT 36, ¶52.
1

2

effect of findings of fact and conclusions of law … upon the evidence.” Id.
(citations omitted).
The Objections are not resolved because the case—the section 24
proceeding now on appeal—is not over.
2. EnerVest has statutory standing.
Fundamentally a case in equity, In re General Det., 355 P.2d 64, 66 (Utah
1960), this general determination is a “statutory process created to confer
legitimacy on those claiming lawful ownership based on beneficial use of the
public waters … [based on] prior appropriation.” Penta Creeks, LLC v. Olds, 2008
UT 25, ¶7, 182 P.3d 362. Water users on the system assert their claims. Utah Code
§73-4-5. The State Engineer evaluates them based largely on a hydrographic, i.e.,
water use, survey, §73-4-11(1)(a), followed by a proposed determination (PD) of
rights for the area, id. §73-4-11 (see, e.g., R(2)-1015-32). The hydrographic surveys
record beneficial use, showing irrigated land and, here, the landowners. (R(2)1586-1593).2
A claimant may object to the PD and litigate. §§73-4-11, -12. See also Eden
Irrig. v. District Court, 211 P. 957, 960 (Utah 1922)(“dissatisfied” claimants may
Until modified by the court and unless a prior decree governs, water is
distribute according to the PD, as submitted or as modified, until the decree is
entered. §73-4-11(3).
2

3

object). Several claimants timely objected, (R(2)-940-944, 946-948, 950-954), for
which section 73-4-24 permits expedited resolution. Although rewritten in 2010,
this section permits what it always has—“a reasonably prompt resolution of the
issues raised ….” Murdock v. Springville Mun. Corp., 878 P.2d 1147, 1150 (Utah
1994)(discussing prior version). See In re Uintah Basin, 2006 UT 19, ¶55, 133 P.3d
410 (“Section 24 authorizes this court to hear and determine the dispute
….”)(internal quotations and citations omitted).
EnerVest claims the use of water rights 90-24 and 90-196 identified in the
PD. (R(2)-1586-96). Although its predecessor did not object, that is no bar to
resolution of other timely objections in which EnerVest “has a direct interest.”
§73-4-24(1).

It plainly meets that test, as Carlson and the State Engineer

stipulated. (R(2)-262-265). Like Carlson, EnerVest is a successor in interest to a
claimant; its rights are at issue. (R(2)-263).
Carlson argues that EnerVest lost appellate standing because objectors
Hammerschmid Trust and Motte, did not also appeal.

(Carlson brf. 18-22).

Carlson’s appellate standing theory fails for three reasons. First, §73-4-16(1)
guarantees “a right of appeal from a final judgment of the district court”
consistent with §78A-3-102 (this court’s jurisdiction). That appeal “shall be on

4

the record made” below “and may as in equity cases be on questions of both law
and fact.” §73-4-16(2). Having a “direct interest” in the Objections, and having
litigated them with Carlson’s blessing, EnerVest enjoys the same appellate rights
as any party on the losing end of summary judgment. Utah Code §§73-4-24(1),
73-4-16; Utah R. App. P. 3, 4.3
Second, section 24 standing depends on a claimant’s “direct interest” in
an objection, not who joins it on appeal from a decision on that objection. §73-424(1). Section 73-4-16 does not limit who may appeal, requiring only a “final
judgment ….”

Carlson’s “proper party” theory (Carlson brf. 20), forces the

statute to say something it plainly does not—that a claimant with a direct interest
in an objection may litigate to final judgment but then have no appeal right
unless joined by an objector. Carlson’s unwritten requirement negates section
24’s express and only test—a “direct interest” in the objection. §73-4-24(1).4

Carlson’s argument is strange, and dangerous. According to him, had the court
granted EnerVest’s motion, he—as a claimant and not an objector—would have
no appellate standing.
4 Carlson relies on Washington Cnty., etc. v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58, ¶¶7-10, 82 P.3d
1125, apparently comparing the Water Conservancy Act and the entire general
determination chapter, §73-4, et seq. Washington is no help. There, the district
tried to leverage the statute that created it into omnibus standing. This court
disagreed, explaining that the Act did not create an “express grant of power to
enforce” beneficial use . . . nor . . . to appeal the state engineer’s decisions on
3
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Third, this appeal is a “continuation of the underlying proceeding.”
Friends, etc. v. Dep't. of Nat. Res., 2010 UT 20, ¶13, 230 P.3d 1014. This is not a new
case requiring rebooted standing. For example, appellate rulings become “law of
the case” on remand. UDOT v. Ivers, 2009 UT 56, ¶12, 218 P.3d 583 (citations
omitted). This “mandate rule” is a “branch of [] law of the case []” and “dictates
that pronouncements of an appellate court on legal issues in a case become the
law of the case and must be followed in subsequent proceedings of that case.” Id.
(emphasis added).

The mandate rule makes no sense if trial and appellate

proceedings are distinct actions. It is all the same case.
According to Carlson, however, and without any authority, §73-4-24
creates standing for a “claimant” in the district court, only to take it away on
appeal—what Carlson calls “the rest of the potential judicial process,” relegating
the claimant to “an amicus.” (Carlson brf. 22, n.16). Nonsense. EnerVest has the
statutory right to litigate objections in which it has a direct interest. Having lost,
and like any other litigant civil or criminal, it may appeal. §73-4-16; Utah R. App.
P. 3, 4.5 Its “direct interest” in the now overruled objections has not vanished.

change applications” where the district’s own use would not be affected.
Washington, 2003 UT 58, ¶¶8-9.
5 Carlson is correct that the failure to object to a PD typically forecloses a
challenge. (Carlson brf. 18-21). See U.S. Fuel Co. v. HCIC, 2003 UT 49, ¶19, 79 P.3d
6

3. EnerVest has common law standing.
“[S]tanding … assure[s] the procedural integrity of [judgments] by
requiring that the parties … have a sufficient interest in the subject matter of the
dispute and sufficient adverseness that the legal and factual issues … will be
thoroughly explored.” Terracor v. Utah Bd., etc,, 716 P.2d 796, 798 (Utah 1986). If
standing is challenged on appeal, the party “must show … standing under the
traditional test in [the action below].” Chen v. Stewart, 2005 UT 68, ¶50, 123 P.3d
416 (citations omitted).
The first common law element is that EnerVest incur “some distinct and
palpable injury [giving it] a personal stake in the outcome ….” Terracor, 716 P.2d
at 799 (citations omitted). EnerVest claims a right to use water from Minnie
Maud Creek. (R(1)-4101-4102). That claim is directly at issue and plainly affected
by the Objections. See generally Plain City Irr. Co. v. Hooper Irr. Co., 51 P.2d 1069,
1072 (Utah 1935)(“[I]f a claimant … ha[s] objections or [its] rights could be
affected adversely, [the claimant is] entitled to notice … otherwise [it is not]
bound by the judgment.”); Utah Code §73-4-13.

945. In that distinguishable case, however, there were no timely objections,
allowing the district court to enter judgment based on an unobjectionable PD. Id.
¶19.
7

As a water right claimant in the water source, EnerVest is a party to this
general determination.

Its rights are at issue thanks to the Objections and

Carlson’s response to them. That is, by virtue of Minnie Maud share ownership,
and not beneficial use, Carlson claims to own 60.12% of all the water rights, two
of which are approved for use only on EnerVest’s land (EnerVest rights 90-24
and 90-196). (EnerVest brf., Addendum 7). Carlson seeks to take over the use of
water he’s never previously used on land he’s never owned or irrigated and
probably never stepped foot on. He claims 60% of water rights used by others
and their successors on their own land for more than a century. (Compare R(2)1586-93 and Addendum 7, with R(2)-957-60).

The dispute could hardly be

sharper.
Standing is further permitted “if no one else has a greater interest in the
outcome … and the issues are unlikely to be raised at all unless that particular
[party] has standing ….” Terracor, 716 P.2d at 799. Motte and Hammerschmid
did not appeal because they could not afford it. Their objections are no less
legitimate, so EnerVest, with the same argument and “direct interest” continues
the effort.6

Carlson notes that EnerVest did not ask the court to reverse its denied MSJ.
(Carlson brf. 14). That ruling “is not a final decision on the merits of that issue …
6

8

Finally, standing is available for anyone to litigate “unique” issues “of
such great public importance that they ought to be decided in furtherance of the
public interest.” Id. Exploiting a century of ambiguous corporate history and
sacrificing Minnie Maud’s substance to its form so that he can take title to more
water than he or his predecessors ever used, Carlson’s theory undermines a
fundamental public interest.
In Utah, the beneficial use of water and the rights that come with it are
about as important as it gets. Water is the resource. Its value is “inestimable,”
and “beneficial use” its lodestar. Delta Canal Co. v. [Vincent], 2013 UT 69, ¶¶1925. This public resource is subject only to the right to use it. Utah Code §73-1-1.
That right (not the water itself) constitutes private property. §57-1-1(3).
The historical development of our water law indicates that
rights to the use of water are firmly grounded upon three
things: (1) initiative in discovering useable water resources,
(2) industry in taking overt action to bring the water under
control for the purpose of putting it to a beneficial use, and (3)
diligence in continuing the use thus established.
unless the … ruling clearly states otherwise and … can properly resolve an issue
with finality.” Dunlap v. Stichting Mayflower Mtn., 2005 UT App 279, ¶2, 119 P.3d
302 (citations omitted). The parties cross-moved, (R(2)-778-874; 881-988; 9971068), “implicitly contend[ing] that [each] is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law, but that if the court determines otherwise, factual disputes exist [precluding
summary] judgment” for the other side. Wycalis v. Guardian Title, 780 P.2d 821,
825 (Utah App. 1989), cert. denied, 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1990). EnerVest appealed the
final judgment (R(2)-1908-1910), not a non-final, non-appealable, non-judgment.
9

Weber Basin etc. v. Gailey, 328 P.2d 175, 178 (Utah 1958).
These principles “constitute the only recognized foundation upon which
rights in water can be created and maintained.” Id. Concerning the water used
by Mottes, Hammerschmids, and EnerVest, and their predecessors, Carlson has
done precisely none of these things. Neither he nor his predecessors diverted
and beneficially used that water. Rather, his only “initiative” was to purchase, in
1998, shares in a corporation formally dissolved in 1974, (R(1)-4140-4141; R(2)1068), expecting to leverage the shares into rights to water others diverted and
used on their own land.
This proceeding and EnerVest’s position furthers the public policy that
those who divert and beneficially use water earn the right to continue. Eskelsen v.
Town, 819 P.2d 770, 775 (Utah 1991)(“An appropriative water right depends on
beneficial use for its continued validity.”). As a “claimant” with a “direct
interest,” EnerVest seeks to enforce the underpinning on which all Utah water
use is based and thereby has standing to litigate these “unique” issues of “great
public importance.” Terracor, 716 P.2d at 799.

10

B. The Deed cannot support waiver.
1. Minnie Maud’s “legal existence” does not overcome the
restriction on its effectiveness regardless of the Deed.
Carlson argues, correctly, that Minnie Maud achieved “legal existence” but
contends that EnerVest did not, and now cannot, challenge that ruling. (Carlson
brf. 23-26). The company’s acceptance of the Deed is, therefore, at worst ultra
vires and voidable, according to Carlson. Id. This is Carlson’s best argument, but
he still misses the mark.
First, if by “legal existence,” Carlson means that a corporate entity was
recognized based on code-compliant Articles, then there is nothing to challenge.
EnerVest makes the point in its opening brief. (Brf. 18). That is only the first
question, however, to determine whether the entity was “effective,” whether it
had any corporate power, and whether it was authorized to own property in 1902
(the Deed), or the water rights in 1964, via the PD.
No corporation may act “in any way not authorized in its . . . articles . . . or
bylaws.” Okelberry v. West Daniels Land Assoc., 2005 UT App 327, ¶14, 120 P.3d 34
(citation omitted). It can do only what its shareholder-approved articles permit.
Thompson v. McFarland, 82 P. 478, 480 (Utah 1905). That limit is strictly enforced.
Zion’s Bank v. Tropic, etc., 126 P.2d 1053, 1054 (Utah 1942).
11

The Articles are clear. Only one thing could animate Minnie Maud—3000
shares from the unpaid portion of the authorized total of 8,000. (R(2)-806). The
Deed on which Carlson and the district court rely does not do that. It reflects
only 2,377 “paid up” shares, about which the Articles are also explicit.

Id.

Minnie Maud had no function without 3,000 shares in addition to the 2,377
exchanged for the Deed. Id. Evidently, the venture depended on a certain critical
mass. The point, however, is that the Deed names a grantee powerless to accept
it, because its creators explicitly said so. The PD likewise names a water right
“owner” that was not “effective” for that, or any, purpose. (R(2)-1015-1032).7
Arguing ultra vires, Carlson is more right than he realizes. “Ultra vires”
means “beyond the powers.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1755 (10th ed. 2014).8
Everything was ultra vires for Minnie Maud. “Ultra vires” is a lot like what

Southam v. South Despain Ditch Co., 2014 UT 35, 337 P.3d 236 is instructive.
There, a party acquired shares in violation of bylaw-based restrictions on share
transfers. The company argued and the district court agreed that the restrictions
were enforceable, meaning that the sale was void. Id. ¶¶6-7. This court affirmed,
holding that Utah Code §16-6a-606 required enforcement of the restrictions. Id.
¶¶17, 23.
8 And “[u]nauthorized; beyond the scope of power allowed or granted by a
corporate charter or by law.” Black’s, at 1755.
7

12

Hammerschmids, Mottes, and Keel have been saying since the 1950s. (R(2)-92835; 1052-66; 1317-22).9
Invoking Ockey v. Lehmer, 2008 UT 37, ¶18, 189 P.3d 51, Carlson argues that
the deed is merely voidable. (Carlson brf. 24-25). The flaw, however, is that no
one had authority to either ratify the deed or pursue voidability, except perhaps
the Deed’s grantors. Minnie Maud certainly could not.
2. The Deed cannot as a matter of law waive the Share
Requirement.
Second, and this goes also to the district court’s ruling (see Carlson brf. 2630), the Deed does not waive anything, certainly not expressly. Although waiver
can be implied, it must always be “distinct.” Soter’s, Inc. v. Deseret Fed., etc., 857
P.2d 935, 937 (Utah 1993). Sensibly, that “requirement” means that waiver must
be “clearly intended ….”

Id. at 940.

An ambiguous waiver is no waiver,

certainly not on summary judgment. If not express, the “totality of the
circumstances” must support “the inference of [waiver].” Id. at 941. If based on a
“writing, and no extrinsic evidence of the meaning of ambiguous terms is
presented, waiver is a question of law ….” Lane Myers Constr., LLC v. Nat’l City
The parties flailed some in the district court as they grappled with what to do
with Minnie Maud’s ephemeral existence, such as de jure and de facto questions,
(R(2)-2168-70), and its formal demise in 1974. The issues have crystallized on
appeal.
9

13

Bank, 2014 UT 58, ¶49, 342 P.3d 749 (Durham, J., concurring). See, e.g., Zions Bank
v. Saxton, 493 P.2d 602, 603 (Utah 1972)(express, written lien waiver).
The Deed is clear, saying nothing about the Share Requirement and
reflecting only “paid up” stock. (R(2)-1279; EnerVest brf., Addendum 3). Carlson
offers no defense for how an instrument, void or voidable, ultra vires or not, that
reflects performance under one provision of the Articles (R(2)-805-06), waives
performance under another, when the second—the Share Requirement—
conditions the entire agreement. He avoids the paid versus unpaid share issue
altogether.10

Soter’s wrestles with the distinctness element, wondering whether, if retained,
waiver should require clear and convincing evidence. 857 P.2d at 942, n.6. The
burden aside, EnerVest urges that distinctness be retained. Waiver is defined
with muscular terms, “intentional relinquishment of a known right,” Id. at 939-940
(emphasis added), and should not be chipped away, whether involving
constitutional rights of the accused, see American Fork City v. Crosgrove, 701 P.2d
1069, 1075 (Utah 1985)(Stewart, J., concurring), or property and contract rights,
also constitutionally protected. Utah Const. Art. I §§1, 7, 22 (private property)
and 1, 18 (contract). The distinctness element levels the playing field between
contracting parties of unequal strength. Cf. majority opinion and dissent of
Durham, J., in Allen v. Prudential, etc., 839 P.2d 798 (Utah 1992).
10

14

3. Any inference of waiver is undermined by the facts.
Waiver is the “intentional11 relinquishment12 of a known13 right.”14 Soter’s,
857 P.2d at 939-940. Carlson’s theory cannot account for critical undisputed facts:
1. Minnie Maud Creek water users were already diverting and using their
water. (R(2)-805-06). The only issue was the terms of incorporation.
They determined the venture unworkable without critical mass,
presumably to make it economical. That is why mutual irrigation
companies form—“for convenience of operation and more efficient
distribution ….” Genola Town v. Santaquin City, 80 P.2d 930, 936 (Utah
1938).
2. Later water users acquired land irrigated from the creek.

The PD

confirms this in exacting detail, identifying precise, irrigated acres,
naming the owners thereof, and assigning separate water rights to each
parcel, where water was diverted and the land farmed by people in no
way dependent on Minnie Maud. (R(2)-1586-1593).

“Done with the aim of carrying out the act.” Black’s Law Dictionary 932 (10th
ed. 2014)(emphasis added), i.e., distinct?
12 Abandonment. Black’s, at 1482.
13 To “have in mind,” “acknowledged.” Oxford American Dictionary, 437 (1999).
14 Interest, claim, or ownership. Black’s, at 1517.
11
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3. Although the PD distributes water based on irrigated acres with
separate water right numbers, (R(2)-1018-1031), the Articles state that
water distribution was to be “in the proportion [of their shares],” (R(2)806), again typical for such companies. Genola, 80 P.2d at 936 (water
allocated “in proportion” to shares).
4. Carlson has never claimed to own more than 1,429 of the 2,377 issued
shares (60%). (R(2)-959-60).
shares. (R(2)-803).

The Articles, however, authorize 8,000

His shares are just 18% of that total. Under his

theory, however, relying solely on the 2,377 “paid up” shares, and
ignoring the unpaid portion that mattered most to the original
irrigators, he gets 60%, of the water across the board.

(R(1)-4137,

4141).15
The facts on which Carlson relies to show waiver occur mostly between
1902 and 1911, about the time the dam failed. (Carlson brf. 27-29). Carlson
argues that “[b]etween 1902 and 1955, the Incorporators and their successor

Carlson speculated below that the Share Requirement may have been satisfied
with treasury stock issued to pay for reservoir work (R(2)-1007-08; 1621), which
the Articles permit. (R(2)-806). If so, then his theory is further mired in
uncertainty because he could not own 60%. He would own some percentage less
than that depending on how many hypothetical treasury shares were issued. He
abandons that argument here.
15

16

shareholders held and took record of corporate meetings.” Id. at 28. Not exactly.
The minutes show spotty activity after those early years. In 1920, “less than a
majority of the issued and outstanding stock of this company was present”; in
1951, “notice” was sent “but no one came”; “no one came” again in 1952, and in
1954 two showed. Id., Addendum E.
Minnie Maud had at best a brief role in water distribution. While some
clung to the corporate form, the irrigators diverted and used water without
regard to the entity on land that was never defined or mapped as part of a
company service area, and to which the PD assigns separate water rights.
C. EnerVest preserved its argument concerning the PD.
Carlson argues that EnerVest failed to preserve its argument that “the
district court’s legal conclusion of waiver is inconsistent with the General
Determination and the PD.” (Carlson brf. 30). He contends that EnerVest never
“alert[ed] the district court that a ruling in [his] favor … would be inconsistent
with the [PD].” Id. at 31.
Preservation requires that the district court have “an opportunity to rule
on an issue.” Baird v. Baird, 2014 UT 08, ¶20, 322 P.3d 728 (citations omitted).
The issue must be timely, specific, and supported by “evidence or relevant legal
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authority.” Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998)(citation
omitted).
Under the heading, “[t]he water users and the PD have always distributed
water based on irrigated acres, not Minnie Maud shares,” (R(2)-1622), EnerVest
argued at length that, although Minnie Maud was ostensibly formed consistent
with irrigation companies generally (and cited cases, R(2)-1622-1623), and
although the PD says Minnie Maud owns the water rights, the PD also maps and
allocates water based on irrigated acres on individually owned land, with
distinct water rights, (see R(2)-1586–93), rather than based on a single right used
in a company service area, typical for mutual irrigation companies.
EnerVest argued that,
the PD assigns each of the water rights in the name of Minnie
Maud to very specific properties on which the right may be
used. The hydrographic survey maps … identify these specific
authorized places of use and their owners … The PD’s
allocation of water rights is acreage-based water use, which
has nothing to do with Minnie Maud shares.
Thus … the PD’s allocation of the water itself was based on
irrigated acres belonging to specified individuals, not any
actual or purported corporate shares—the rights are tied to
acreage ….

18

(R(2)1622-23)(citations omitted). (See also R(2)-1625). EnerVest argued the point
at length. (R(2)-2152-63).16
In other words, EnerVest argued below, and repeats here, that Carlson’s
theory that the corporation distributed water based on shares is inconsistent with
the PD’s mapping of and allocation to private property, identifying the ownerirrigators and assigning specific water rights to those properties, (R(2)-1586–93,
1622-23, 1625, 2152-63; EnerVest brf., Addendum 7; Addendum 8), including
Carlson’s own predecessor. Id. No Minnie Maud service area is defined or
mapped.

The term “service area” is not defined other than in the context of cases
discussing it, but it is well understood. For mutual irrigation companies, it is
essentially the footprint made up of shareholder land served by company water,
and generally defines the authorized place of use. In McMullin v. Public Serv.
Comm’n, 320 P.2d 1107 (Utah 1958), for example, this court affirmed the
Commission’s denial of a landowner's petition to compel an irrigation company
to furnish culinary water to a proposed subdivision. The property was beyond
the company service area, and furnishing water would imperil present and
future service. Id. at 1107. The landowner argued that the service area
boundaries were “uncertain” and that his property was “reasonably within the
service area.” Id. at 1108. The irrigation company constructed a pipeline to
deliver culinary water to its stockholders “within a given area.” Id. It argued that
its responsibility extended “only within the area it is presently committed to
serve” as designated on a map filed with the Commission. Id. This court agreed:
because “the service area to which the [irrigation company] is already committed
to serve” still had significant growth potential, adding the new land would
imperil service “within the locality now covered.” Id.
16
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A reasonable inference exists when “there is at least a foundation in the
evidence upon which the ultimate conclusion is based,” while “speculation” has
“no underlying evidence to support [it].” Heslop v. Bear River, etc., 2017 UT 5,
¶22, --P.3d-- (citation omitted). (R(2)-1388). Invoking those undisputed facts,
EnerVest invited the district court to consider available inferences, and
specifically that
[d]espite the attempt to incorporate, the condition precedent was not
met, the water users (who would have been shareholders) allocated
and used the water according to their acreage. That’s what
Anderson states, what the answers in the 1957 litigation and
Objections assert, what they stipulated to when staying the 1950’s
litigation … and it is how the PD memorialized actual water use.
(R(2)-1623)(exhibit cites omitted).
EnerVest explained below that , “[i]f Carlson’s theory that water should be
allocated according to shares is taken to its logical conclusion, Carlson will own a
portion of a water right that has always been, and may only be, used on property
he neither owns nor claims to own.” (R(2)-1623)(evidence citations omitted).
D. EnerVest did not expand the section 24 hearing.
Carlson argues that EnerVest improperly expanded the section 24 hearing
because one of its arguments—that “Minnie Maud’s ownership of the Water
Rights is inconsistent with the [PD]”—was not raised in the Objections. (Carlson
20

brf. 32). Carlson misreads the Objections. The inconsistency problem is less an
argument and more just further evidence that the PD got it wrong.
Amber Keel claimed to own water rights and objected accordingly:
(a) That said water rights are not owned by the Minnie Maud
Irrigation Company as stated in the [PD].
(b) That said water rights are owned by Amber Keel by reason
of the use of said waters for irrigation purposes and stock
watering purposes upon the land set forth in said Water
Users Claim . . . and the use continuously thereof to date
….
(R(2)-946; see also R(2)-2152-63).
The combined Sprouse-Hammerschmid Objection also illustrates:
(a) They objected “[f]or the reason that the water rights to the
said land belonging to these objectors, and not to [Minnie
Maud].”
(b) “That as a further objection these objectors allege that
[Minnie Maud] has no right, title or interest in or to the
said water rights used upon the lands of these objectors.
(R(2)-951-52)(emphasis added).
EnerVest’s arguments are entirely consistent with the Objections. They say
the same thing—the users diverted the water to their own land without company
involvement based on irrigated acres, not corporate shares or a company service
area. (EnerVest brf., Addendum 6). The PD is correct in every respect, in other
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words, except for naming the water right owner. This is precisely what the
original Petition claimed—that the PD’s only error was naming Minnie Maud the
owner of the water rights. (R(1)-4103-06). Carlson stipulated that (1) the petition
(R(1)-4085-4154) “meets the statutory requirements of … section 73-4-24”; and (2)
“the Petition will facilitate a reasonably prompt resolution of the … Objections,”
satisfying Utah Code §73-4-24(4)(b). (R(2)-263).
Carlson argues that the PD water right allocation to specific land owned by
the water claimants is irrelevant to the validity of the Deed. (Carlson brf. 32-33).
That is misdirection. The Deed appears to have had no effect on the substance of
the PD. That is, the PD identifies landowners and assigns specific water rights to
their farms. Had Minnie Maud actually regulated that irrigation, we would
expect the PD to identify a service area. That it does not, and that it assigns
individual water rights to specific property, are among the facts compelling the
inference that Minnie Maud was not operational—no role in water distribution
(because the Share Requirement was neither met nor waived), and that “all the
water users took their own water from their own places of diversion and this
water was never regulated or controlled by the irrigation company.” Id.,
Addendum C. The answers in the 1950’s litigation and the Objections say the
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same thing. (R(2)-828-33, 928-35, 1052-66). The parties so stipulated when they
stayed that action. (R(2)-1407-1415).17
E. Laches and estoppel do not apply.
Carlson invokes equity in the form of laches and estoppel. (Carlson brf. 3339). He is correct that this general determination rests in equity, Utah Code §734-16; In re Bear River, 361 P.2d 407, 408-10 (Utah 1961), but that does not help him.
Consistent with how general determinations work, this court explains that “[a]
court of equity . . . cannot create rights, but is limited to determine what rights
the parties have and whether or in what manner it is just and proper to enforce
them.” Spanish Fork, etc. v. District Court, 104 P.2d 353, 359 (Utah 1940).18
Rooted in equity, laches requires one party’s “lack of diligence” and a
“resulting” injury. Fundamentalist Church, etc. v. Lindberg, 2010 UT 51, ¶27, 238
P.3d 1054. It means “a defendant must establish both that the plaintiff

St. George City v. Kirkland, 409 P.2d 970 (Utah 1966), is mildly instructive.
There, a company everyone agreed existed expired because apparently
“everyone innocently forgot about the date the charter lapsed.” Id. at 971. The
shareholders continued irrigating as they had and four years later formed a new
company “with the same name … directors, shareholders and [share] allocation
….” Id. This court held that the water users preserved their right to continue so
long as the water was actually beneficially used. Id. at 972.
18 General determinations are a kind of quiet title action, confirming rights based
on beneficial use, not creating new rights. See, e.g., In re Bear River, 271 P.2d 846,
848 (Utah 1954).
17
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unreasonably delayed in bringing an action and that the defendant was
prejudiced by that delay.” Borland v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1987).
First, laches is not available to Carlson. He already stipulated that the
section 24 “Petition will facilitate a reasonably prompt resolution of the matters
raised in the Objections” and that “[g]ranting the Petition does not prejudice the
right of another claimant …,” i.e., him. (R(2)-263).
Second, equity cannot aid Carlson. For decades the irrigators diverted and
used water on their land without company involvement. (Carlson brf.,
Addendum C)(“all the water users took their own water from their own places of
diversion and this water was never regulated or controlled by the irrigation
company.”). It was not until 1957 when Carlson’s predecessor (Davis) sued the
other irrigators—seeking the same 60% allocation Carlson does (R(2)-1351-56)—
that they had any reason to defend their historic use and assert Minnie Maud’s
irrelevance. (R(2)-928-35, 1317-22; EnerVest brf., Addendum 5).19 The Objections
raise the identical issues. (Id., Addendum 6). Until Davis sued, however, there
was nothing to which to object.
Although Davis mentions Minnie Maud, it’s curious that he did not sue it for
not delivering the water he believed he was entitled to based on his shares.
(R(2)-921-926). That would have been his remedy. Uintah Basin, 2006 UT 19, ¶36.
He sued individual water users who flatly denied any corporate affiliation.
(R(2)-928-35, 1317-22, 1351-56; EnerVest brf., Addenda 4-5).
19
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Estoppel is rooted in similar equity principles. Equitable estoppel requires
(1) conduct or statements “inconsistent with” a later claim, (2) “reasonable action
or inaction” by another, and (3) an “injury” traceable to the inconsistency.
Nunley v. Westates Casing Servs., Inc., 1999 UT 100, ¶43, 989 P.2d 1077 (quotations
and citation omitted). “[A] party seeking equity [however] must do so with
clean hands.” LHIW, Inc. v. DeLorean, 753 P.2d 961, 963 (Utah 1988). That is, “a
party who seeks an equitable remedy must have acted in good faith and not in
violation of equitable principles.” Hone v. Hone, 2004 UT App 241, ¶7, 95 P.3d
1221.20
Here, in the equity arena, Carlson is at great disadvantage. Consider what
he attempted. He acquired Minnie Maud shares twenty-four years after it was
formally dissolved (R(1)-4140-4141; R(2)-1068), apparently with scant due
diligence, which is an aspect of good faith. See Zions Bank v. Crapo, 2017 UT 12,
¶35, -- P.3d -- (reasonable reliance requires “diligence to investigate the accuracy
of the representation.”).
Speaking of good faith, in his 2000 letter to the division of water rights,
Carlson explains some, but only some, of the long history concerning these water
See SLC Corp. v. Big Ditch Irr. Co., 2011 UT 33, ¶40, 258 P.3d 539 (“equitable
estoppel is a disfavored remedy. It should be applied rarely, and only when
necessary to avoid injustice”)(citations omitted).
20
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rights. (R(1)-4137-41; Addendum 9). He mentions the 1950’s Davis action (only
the Davis complaint), but never discloses the competing legal positions or that
Minnie Maud’s existence and function were directly challenged. He downplays
the case and begs its central issue, claiming it was merely “to resolve an
ownership dispute over the use of water rights owned by [Minnie Maud].” (R(1)4137)(emphasis added). He offers that the case ended in standstill, (R(1)-4138;
R(2)-1414-1415), meaning that the “ownership dispute” was not resolved, but
fails to mention that in 1957 the parties stipulated to water distribution, with
Carlson’s predecessor receiving water for 36% of the irrigated acres instead of
60% of the water rights he sought from the division. (R(2)-1407-1409). Minnie
Maude had no hand in that water distribution.
Carlson mentions the ongoing general determination and the PD, but
claims there were no objections. (R(1)-4139). The Objections, of course,—by the
same parties to the Davis action—directly challenge his claim to water based on
company shares and not his own or his predecessor’s actual beneficial use,
measured by irrigated acres. (R(1)-4137-4141; R(2)-940-944, 946-948, 950-954).
Though troubling, these omissions are not the worst of it. In a letter in
which he seeks to “update” water right title (while this general determination
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was still pending), Carlson again dissembles. (R(1)-4137-41; Addendum 9). His
title chain starts with a farmer named Allred, whose property is mapped in the
PD, with two water rights approved for use on that ground. (R(2)-1586–93).
Carlson omits Allred, claiming that his title chain starts with a 1962 conveyance
from Davis. (R(1)-4140)(a point EnerVest emphasized below--(R(2)-2152-57).
There is a reason for the omission: Allred’s property is mapped, and his
irrigation accounted for, in the PD, with two and only two water rights approved
for use on that ground—rights 90-197 and 90-299. (R(2)-1586–93). Only that water
was used beneficially on the ground Carlson acquired, and under the law, unless
excepted, it passed by appurtenance.

Utah Code §§73-1-10, -11.

Acquiring

shares in a dissolved corporation, however, Carlson hopes to leverage that
position into title to 60% of all the rights. In other words, Carlson invites a peek
at history to “update” title. Closer scrutiny reveals that his title chain involves
specific property on which specific water rights are approved for use.
Mentioning Allred would have drawn more attention to history than Carlson
wanted.21

EnerVest’s opening brief says Carlson “would acquire here more water than he
could have ever had as a Minnie Maud shareholder.” (Brf. 39). This is
embarrassingly wrong, missed in editing. It’s just the opposite. Under his share
theory, Carlson gets more water than he or his predecessors ever used. EnerVest,
21
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The difference between what Carlson did and what EnerVest is doing is
nowhere better illustrated than a comparison between Carlson’s letter, (R(1)4137-41; Addendum 9), and the section 24 petition that started this case. (R(1)4085-4154). Carlson cherry picks history, never disclosing that his claim (and
Davis’s before him), (R(1)-4137-41; R(2)-1351-56, 1407-1415), was timely
challenged, twice (in the Davis litigation and in the Objections), and still
pending. Presumably, he expected (hoped?) the State Engineer would miss those
challenges and “update” title, bypassing the general determination. So much for
due process. The petition tells the story. (R(1)-4085-4107).
Furthermore, equitable estoppel is “a defense raised by a party against
whom relief is sought when the other party misrepresented facts….”
Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2007 UT 28, ¶17, 158 P.3d 1088. Neither
EnerVest nor its predecessors is even accused of, let alone found to have engaged
in, any misrepresentation.
Carlson insists that “EnerVest should be estopped from now objecting to
Minnie Maud’s ownership of the Water Rights” based on early corporate
on the other hand, gets about the same amount under either a share- or acrebased allocation. EnerVest advocates the latter because it is the right course,
based on beneficial use, and is consistent with the parties’ historic water use and
the purpose of this general determination—the judicial recognition of beneficial
use. Penta Creeks, 2008 UT 25, ¶7.
28

activities. (Carlson brf. 37-38). He gets it backwards. While Minnie Maud
achieved de jure existence (lawful corporate form), it is more importantly true
that the individual irrigators have for a century diverted water and irrigated
their land based on acres identified in the PD (and since 1964, with distinct water
rights approved for use on that land), and not corporate shares and not based on
a company service area. (Carlson brf., Addendum C; EnerVest brf., Addenda 56).
EnerVest is not the party trying to change a century of beneficial water use
and the rights that come with it. That’s Carlson. He tried the back door, without
telling the affected water users, knowing (or should have) that parties disputed
Minnie Maude’s efficacy and Davis’ other claims in the 1957 litigation and in the
Objections. (R(1)-4137-4141).22
Carlson’s equity theories sow chaos because he exalts form—Minnie
Maud’s de jure existence—way over substance. Minnie Maud was contractually
He argues that Minnie Maud’s existence or water right title went unquestioned
until 1957. (Carlson brf. 38). Possibly true but not terribly persuasive. The Davis
action may have raised it for the first time (EnerVest brf., Addendum 4), ending
in a stay to await the PD (R(2)-1414), followed by the Objections on the same
issue. (EnerVest brf., Addendum 6). In the meantime, before and after the PD,
for more than 100 years, the irrigators controlled their own diversions. (Id.,
Addenda 5-6; Carlson brf., Addendum C). EnerVest’s predecessor (Christensen)
may have thought Minnie Maud was effective, (Carlson brf. 38, Addendum F),
but the timely Objections preserved the issue.
22
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neutered. “It is the purpose of the law, [after all] and of the court in
administering it, to do justice and to look through form to substance when
necessary to accomplish that purpose.” Dixon v. Stoddard, 627 P.2d 83, 87 (Utah
1981).
Substantively, the PD assigns each water right to a precisely defined
approved place of use, each owned and irrigated by separate parties.23

For

example, water rights 90-24 and 90-196 may be used only on land owned by
EnerVest and its predecessors.

(EnerVest brf., Addendum 7; R(2)-1586-1617;

Addendum 8). Conversely, EnerVest and its predecessors have never owned or
irrigated Carlson’s (or his predecessors’) land, which may be irrigated only with
water rights 90-197 and 90-299. Id. Water right 90-24 may not be used on
Carlson’s property, and 90-197 may not be used on EnerVest’s property.
Accordingly, for the parties to use fully the water on their land under
Carlson’s theory, each would have to get State Engineer approval to change the
approved place of use established by the PD. See Utah Code §73-3-3 (change
applications). This is a terrible result at war with the very purpose of the general
determination. A “key goal” of this process, after all, “is to remove doubts about
Concerning the approved place of water use, see generally Ruth B. Hardy Rev.
Trust v. Eagle Mtn. City, 2012 UT App 352, 295 P.3d 188. See also Utah Code §733-3(a)(approved change required for new place of water use).
23
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the validity of water rights.” In re Rights to the Use of Water, 2004 UT 106, ¶41, 110
P.3d 666. The PD does not allocate water use in the manner Carlson urges,
because the parties never used water that way. (Carlson brf., Addendum C;
EnerVest brf., Addenda 5-6). The parties will be forced into a series of
overlapping changes so that, eventually, water use matches Carlson’s desired
outcome.
Carlson’s theory guarantees inimical results.

First, the adjudication of

Minnie Maud Creek ends, not with a decree that memorializes a century of
beneficial use, as all such cases are designed to do. It ends only after these
overlapping change applications—changing the approved place of use—are
approved. That is the only way to make Carlson’s theory work.
Second, he undermines one of the purposes of mutual irrigation company
service areas by forcing these Minnie Maud “shareholders” to do exactly what
this court long ago said they need not do: Shareholders are not required to seek
State Engineer approval to change irrigation within a company service area.
Syrett v. Tropic, etc., 89 P.2d 474, 475 (Utah 1939). That is precisely what Carlson’s
theory forces.
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CONCLUSION
This court should reverse.
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ADDENDUM
8. Color Maps from EnerVest’s Summary Judgment Hearing Materials
9. Carlson’s June 28, 2000 Letter to the State Engineer (R(1)-4137-41)
10. Determinative Statutes and Rules (Utah R. App. 24(a)(6))
a. Utah Code 73-4-24 (2006)
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Addendum 8

Addendum 9
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Utah Division of Water Rights
1594 West North Temple, Suite 220 .

Salt Lake city. UT Q4114
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Re:

.

Minnie Maud Reservoir ‘and Irrigation Company
Water_Right ﬂbs. 90-24, 90-184, 90-135,
90-186, 90-187, 90-188, 90-189, 90-190,_
90-191, 90-196, 90-197 and 90-299
-

‘
'

¢

Ladies and Gentlemen:
Based on discussions with Jim Riley, I am submitting this
request to update your records regarding ownership of a portion of
the.water rights now listed in the name of the Minnie Maude
Irrigation Company, which rights allow diversion and use of water
from Minnie Maud Creek {also known as Nine Mile Creek) in Carbon
County.

I
\
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1'h_e_ £o11§>Wi11-9‘ facts are taken from (1) the Articles of
Agreement of Incorporation of the Minnie Maud Reservoir and
Irrigation Company, and (2) a Complaint filed by Ernest E. Davis,
Jr. on -May 4, 1.957 in the Seventh Judicial District Court for
Carbon County _to resolve an ownership disfute over the use o£_ water
rights owned by the Minnie Maud Reserve r and Irrigation Co
y
(see attached copies) . The Minnie Maud Reservoir and I2.-riga€:l.on
Cfompany .(the "Co'lEaeny") was organized as a Utah corporation ‘on
March 2?, 1902. Company-‘s water rights came from conveyances
of the original shareholders‘ ‘water rights in Minnie Maud Creek.
The company issued 2.37? shares of stock and, as of 1957, the
Company had seven shareholders with ownership as followsz.
'
Ernest E. Davis, Jr.
Thomas Christensen
Sud Christensen
T,F. Housekeeper
Amber Keel
.
Louis Motto

Bernard Iriart
.

j1‘O’.tAL

-

.

1,429 shares
199% shares
199%'shares
260'shares
18_2 shares
68 shares
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§2_shsres__;
2 , 37? shares
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;
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These seven shareholders were all parties to _the 1957 lawsuit.

°““”“““‘_
._

'

us§uuassesns-swmzuw-aazsecaguuhanzraev

Iﬂqhmuﬁﬂﬂﬁibﬂ-ﬁmﬁmkﬂH5EbﬁB~emdId@@pﬂmnmm
W ..-—.

1,-;,+._>___..n. 4;-———— ~

—~::_e>..~

~

l
. -— a

:.;:—

—.-K-_ "

004137

I

'

|
‘
1

1
I
\

f\

lhkavwsoows

W‘

Gnnalovnns

'

-

1

Utah Division of Water Rights
Jllllﬂ 28,
Page 2
-_

.

.

-

2000
|%_

According to the Complaint, each shareholder received stock
certificates in the above amounts. Ernest Davis was the largest
shareholder. with 1,429 shares-or 60.12% of the total issued and
outstanding shares.
The Company's water rights were used for
irrigation and' stockwatering in the Nine Mile Canyon area where
Davis and the other shareholders owned. land. As of 1957, Davis and
his predecessors in interest had used his share of the Company's
water rights ‘for more than 7'0 years (well prior to the 1903
threshold date for diligence use).
'
'

.'I'he attached copies of the Company's articles of incorporation
show that the Company was organized in 1902, that the articles were
filed with the Carbon County Clerk on April 5,‘ 1902 and with the
Utah Secretazéy of State on April 11, 1902, and that the articles
were again
iled in Carbon County (together with Affidavits
regarding oaths of office) on March 22,‘ 1949, at which time Ernest
E. Davis, Jr. was the Company's President and Director.

The Company, according to its articles of incorporation, we
to last for a period of 10.0 years (until 2002} . Annual shareholder
meetings were to be held on the first Monday in March. ‘Share:
holders were to have water distributed to them in proportion to the
amount of shares they owned, and there was only a single class of
stock.
'
_
_
1

I-p

By 1958 the Complaint filed by Ernest Davis in 1957 was put-on
hold pending the outcome of a Proposed Determination of -water
rights by the state Engineer‘, which was to include the Company's
water -rights and the waters of Minnie Maud Cr,ee1_c and .its
tributaries. (Bee attached Stipulation filed May 15. 1958.)
_ By 1962, the 1,429 Davis shares were owned by the Davis family
as follows: Certificate No. 48 issued to Olive M. Davis on March
'7, 1949 for 10 shares; Certificate No. '51 issued to Devon Davis on
August 7, 1962 for 10 shares; and Certificate No. 52 issued to
Ernest.Davis, Jr. on August '7, 1962 for 1,409 shares. Copies of
these certificates are attached. _
'
As contemplated in the Stipulation referenced above, the
Division of Water Rights did complete a Proposed Determination of
water rights for. the drainage area that includes Minnie Maud Creek,

and the determination lists the following water rights as being
owned by "Minnie Maude Irrigation Company"_ (see attached excerpts) :
.
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Page _3

.

-

_

'

l
'

-

- .90-24
90-104
90-100
. 90-100
90-107
90-10090-109
90-190
90-191
90-100
90-19v
90-299

These water rights were published in 1964 without any objections.
No final decree has ever been entered and, -I believe, none is
expected in the near future. In addition to containing these water
rights listed in the name of "Minnie Maude Irrigation Company, " the
Proposed Determination also lists several water rights in Minnie
Maud Creek in the individual names of most of the persons-who were
parties to the 1957 lawsuit. This apparently resolved the central
issue in the lawsuit that some of the parties owned water rights in
Minnie Maud Creek separate and apart from their shareholder
interests in the Company.
'

an

‘I

Unfortunately, the Company ceased to exist sometime after the
1964 Proposed Determination was published, leaving current
ownership of the Company's water rights in limbo. Our search of
the Utah Department of Commerce corporate records indicates that
the Compa_ny_d_oes not currently exist. Moreover, a formal search by
the Department of Commerce resulted in a conclusion that there -are
no official records whatsoever of the Company (see attached report
dated September 8, 1997) .‘ It appears that as the shareholders
ceased to reside in the Nine Mile Canyon-area the Company ceased to
maintain its corporate affairs and became defunct sometime after
1964,, although ndofficial records can he located to explain or
document this.
'
_

-

_
Our client-, Michael Carlson, recently purchased the Wimmer
Ranch property (including water rights), which includes the land,

4

A second requested search by the Utah Department ‘of

Commerce on July 17,

1.998 under the full name of Minnie Maud

Reservoir and Irrigation‘ Company ‘likewise found no current, closed
or archived. records.‘
.
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water rights and water shares formerly owned by the Davis family
(and thereafter by the Wimmer family). On June 27, 2000 I filed
with your office five Reports of Water Right Conveyance documenting
the transfer of title from the Ni-mmers to Mr. Carlson.
Those
Reports ,and the deeds described below (see attached copies) show
that the water rights corresponding to 1,429 of the 2,377 total

issued shares of-the Company, or 00.12% (1.0. the Davis shares),

-are now held by Mr. Carlson:

-

'

‘ _

_

1

Warranty Deed dated November 12, J.96_2 from Ernest Davis, Jr.,
Olive M. Davis, Devon Davis and Jean R. Davis to W-M Ranches,
Inc. (recorded in Carbon County at Book 81, page 274) , This
deed expressly transfers 1,429 shares of the Company to W-M
- Ranches, Inc.
'
Quit-Claim Deed dated August 1-, 1968 from W-M Ranches, Inc. to
Neville I-. Wimmer and Harold 0‘. Wimmer (recorded in Carbon
County at Book 106, page 471) . This deed expressly transfers
15-429 shares of the Company to Neville L. wimmer and Harold Cl‘.
W mmer.
'
[';'_he five Reports of‘ Water Right Conveyance filed by Mr.
Carlson on June 2'7, 2000 document various conveyances of the
subject land and all appurtenant water rights from Neville L.
Wimmer and Harold 0‘. Wimmer (both of whom are now deceased) to
Lily Mae Wimmer, trustee.]
_
_
Warranty Deed dated July 27, 1998 from Lily Mae Wimmer,
successor trustee of the Neville 1|. Wiinmer Revocable Trust
dated June 11, 1981, t_c Michael M. Carlson (recorded in Carbon
County at Book 414,
age 129) .
This deed transfers -the
eubj ect property and all appurtenant water rights, including
"all of Grantor's interest in the Minnie Mau Reservoir and
Irrigation Company and the water rights owned or used by said
company, all shares of said company owned by Grantor or to
which Grantor is entitled, and any interest owned by Grantor
or to which Grantor is entitled in. the water rights and other
assets of said company now held by said company or arising
from any termination or liquidation of said company, past or
present, formal, informal or-defacto."
' Special Warranty Deed dated July 21, 1998 from Lily Mae
Wimmer; successor trustee of the Neville‘ L. Wimmer Revocable
Trust dated June ll, 1981, to Michael M-. Carlson (recorded in
Carbon County at Book 414, page 132) . This deed transfers
cmbmmama
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.

various water rights appurtenant to the subject property,

including water right nos. 90-24, sq-164, 90-185, 90-186, so-

IB7,-90-lB8, 90-189, 90-190, 90-191, 90-196, 90-197 and 90-

'

299, which are all of the water-rights listed in the Proposed
Determination as being owned by Minnie Maude Irrigation
Company.
'
'

In light of the foregoing, would you please amend the
Division's records to show Michael M, Carlson as the owner of
60.12% Of water right Nbﬂ. 90-24, 90-184, 90-l85, 90-186, 90-187,
90-188, 90-189, 90-190, 90-191, 90-196, 90-197 and 90-299. Would

you. also please prepare segre ation filings to segregate Mr.
Carlson's portion of those rigits from the Company's ortion

Finally.
¢j the _B n filing are
@ Qfthe ousezahipeeqhenseﬂ Fae seen ea th€'aLha1‘e
.

'

Mr. Carlson's address is:

Michael M. Carlson

'

' -

1-gaoo South 1300 West

Blufﬁdale, UT

'

M065

This request is being subinittad. prior to the effective date of
the Division's new Report of Water Right Conveyance rule, so I have
not prepared a Report of Water Right Conveyance. Given the unusual
history of these corporate rights, a standard Report of Water Right
conveyance form would not fit well anyway.
This narrative
explanation is provided instead.
Should you need any additional information, please let me
know. Thank you for your help.
.
_ Very truly yoursf

_

'

Daniel A. Jensen
_
Attorney for-Michael M. Carlson
DALI/ca
Enclosures cc:

-

'

Miehael M. Carlson
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Addendum 10

Utah Code §73-4-24 (2006).
§ 73-4-24. Dispute involving rights of less than all parties to general suit -- Petition
-- Notice -- Hearing and determination -- Interlocutory decree
If, during the pendency of a general adjudication suit, there shall be a dispute
involving the water rights of less than all of the parties to such suit, any interested
party may petition the district court in which the general adjudication suit is
pending to hear and determine said dispute. All persons who have a direct interest
in said dispute shall be given such notice as is required by order of the district
court and in addition thereto the district court shall require that notice of the initial
hearing on said dispute be given by publication at least once each week for two
successive weeks in newspapers reasonably calculated to give notice to all water
users on the system. Thereafter the court may hear and determine the dispute and
may enter an interlocutory decree to control the rights of the parties, unless
modified or reversed on appeal, until the final decree in the general adjudication
suit is entered. At that time the district court may after hearing make such
modifications in the interlocutory decree as are necessary to fit it into the final
decree without conflict.

